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A NEW PEREMPTORY INCLUSION TO INCREASE
REPRESENTATIVENESS AND IMPARTIALITY IN JURY
SELECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
"The jury is one of our most democratic institutions."' Trial
by jury allows for the popular participation of society in democrat-
ic decision-making,2 and guarantees a criminal defendant protection
from arbitrary government power.3 It does so by including the
"collective sentiments and conscience of the community" into the
determination of guilt or innocence.4 These interests are constitu-
tionally based in the Sixth Amendment which reads in part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a...
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . ..
The guarantee of a public trial by an impartial jury is also
necessary to secure society's respect for and the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system.6 But this legitimacy will only be sustained
if the jury satisfies society's and the defendant's expectations of an
impartial jury.7 Impartiality is defined as group representativeness,8
1. Hmosm FuKURAi ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 3 (1993).
2. See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doc-
trine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 512 (1986) (discussing the value of
jury participation in criminal trials).
3. Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting A Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 826
(1989) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
4. FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 3.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT-
MENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 32 (1977) (noting that underrepresentation of minorities
on juries contributes to mistrust of the criminal system by minorities).
7. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 544 (discussing how the parties' ideas of the jury's
impartiality impact upon the legitimacy of the jury itself).
8. The Court adopted the definition of an impartial jury as "a body truly representa-
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and the visual image of the jury is perhaps the most significant
indication of representativeness to both society and the defendant.9
To both parties, representativeness is violated by the exclusion of
distinct groups of persons from the jury solely on the basis of their
group membership."0 However, the current method to achieve
representativeness presents a conflict between two interests.
For society, representativeness is achieved by the opportunity
of all citizens to participate as jurors, without being excluded be-
cause of discriminatory jury selection practices. For the criminal
defendant, representativeness is a more inclusive concept that sug-
gests the affirmative presence of his peers on the jury. 2 Both ex-
pectations can be almost completely fulfilled by the random selec-
tion of prospective jurors from extensive source lists of eligible
jurors, provided that groups of citizens are not intentionally exclud-
ed from the lists. 3
tive of the community," in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). The legitimacy of
the jury depends on the representativeness of the jurors to truly speak on behalf of the
community and all of its diverse groups. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 224.
9. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 504 ("What a jury 'looks like' to the community
will affect the community's respect for the verdict."); see also Barbara A. Babcock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552 (1975) ("The ap-
pearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality."') (quoting Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950)) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Court adopted
this concept in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled in part by Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (stating that "'justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice."') (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citations omitted)).
10. "Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments
playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of
jury trial." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see also Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (discussing the unconstitutionality of excluding a juror on account
of his race); Massaro, supra note 2, at 556 (noting that the contents of conventional text-
books on the legal system and trial by jury can provide an indication of the popular
notion of jury impartiality and that today's textbooks teach students to expect women and
minorities on juries). Another indication of the popular opinion is the treatment of juries
in American literature. Id. at 557-59 (suggesting that writers perceive current jury practices
to be unfair to the "different" defendant because of the control of the jury by the ma-
jority).
11. FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 4-5.
12. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1433 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that unrestricted use of peremptory challenges is necessary for the
criminal defendant to ensure peer representation on the jury).
The definition of peer may simply be a member of the same race or ethnic group
as the defendant, or it may be something more. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying
text (discussing definition of peer representation). While the majority of criminal defen-
dants are members of a racial minority, minorities are consistently underrepresented on
juries in both state and federal courts. See FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 3-4 (citing numer-
ous studies supporting the proposition of minority underrepresentation).
13. See FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 13 (noting that juries have not been representative
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However, modem jury selection practices also allow for the
exercise of challenges by the prosecution and defense in selecting
an impartial jury. 4 Party challenges in the jury system provide for
the removal of randomly selected citizens who cannot be impartial
due to bias or prejudice against a party to the case.' One type of
challenge, the peremptory challenge, allows the removal of pro-
spective jurors without reason, 6 and is usually based on a party's
intuitive judgement that the person will be partial to the opposing
side. 7
The peremptory challenge in criminal trials has long been
recognized primarily as a device to protect defendants." The pe-
remptory challenge originally was designed to give the criminal
defendant partial control over jury selection to secure a jury to his
"liking"' 9 and, thus, to legitimize the jury's verdict. This idea of
in the past due to biased selection procedures); see also infra notes 83-86 and accompa-
nying text (discussing random selection of jurors).
14. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 546-48 (suggesting that jury selection processes yield
an impartial jury, but not one that is a true cross-section of the community); see also
infra text accompanying note 89-101 (discussing party selection component of jury selec-
tion).
15. See VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 143 (noting that a person who has preconceived
ideas about a defendant cannot be an impartial judge); see also infra text accompanying
notes 89-108 (discussing the exercise of party challenges to achieve an impartial jury).
"Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will
be most partial toward the other side, are a means of 'eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality
on both sides, . .. thereby 'assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury."'
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)).
16. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised with-
out a reason stated .... " Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) overruled in
part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-13
(discussing generally the history of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the peremptory
challenge).
17. "Indeed, often a reason for [a challenge] cannot be stated, for a trial lawyer's
judgments about a juror's sympathies are sometimes based on experienced hunches and
educated guesses, derived from a juror's responses at voir dire or a juror's 'bare looks
and gestures.' . .... That a trial lawyer's instinctive assessment of a juror's predisposition
cannot meet the high standards of a challenge for cause does not mean that the lawyer's
instinct is erroneous." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also Massaro, supra note 2, at 520
(stating that peremptory challenges are designed to eliminate undesirable jurors).
18. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242 (1965) overruled in part by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). "[Tihe [peremptory] challenge is
'one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused."' Id. at 219 (quoting
Pointer v. U.S., 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
19. The concept of the defendant "liking" his or her jury recognizes the extremely per-
sonal interest at stake and makes the criminal trial appear fair by giving effect to the
defendant's reaction. Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 829; see also Babcock, supra note 9,
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creating a jury to the defendant's "liking" has persisted in Supreme
Court doctrine, which has described an impartial jury as a jury of
the defendant's peers or equals. 2° The Court recognized over a
century ago that "securing representation of the defendant's race on
the jury may help to overcome racial bias and provide the defen-
dant with a better chance of having a fair trial.",2' Thus, by allow-
ing the defendant to shape the composition of the jury to reflect
minority perspectives which may be absent from the majority popu-
lation, the peremptory challenge historically has been the primary
method for the criminal defendant to achieve impartiality.'
However, this tradition of arbitrary peremptory challenges
conflicts with society's goals of representativeness by allowing
prospective jurors to be removed based on their group membership.
The Court has recognized that the peremptory challenge empowers
"those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."' The
harm caused by such a discriminatory jury selection practice is
greater than the attached stigma to the excluded group; discrimina-
tory practices undermine the public's confidence in the legitimacy
of the jury system.24 As a result, in Batson v. Kentucky,' the
Court announced a prohibition against the exercise of peremptory
at 552 (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (William Draper Lewis ed.,
1897), for the origin of the concept of "liking"). Blackstone wrote: "How necessary it is
that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of the jury, the
want of which might totally disconcert him." Id. at 552 n.26.
20. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine .... " Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
21. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
22. See Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 827 (noting that peremptory challenges are a way
for defendants to protect themselves from biased juries).
23. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)).
24. "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness
of our system of justice." Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. The Batson Court found that public
respect for the system of justice and the rule of law will be strengthened by the prohibi-
tion of racially discriminatory jury selection practices. Id. at 99.
The Court reaffirmed this principle in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1430 (1994) (extending the prohibition of discriminatory peremptory challenges to
include gender). Justice Blackmun stated for the majority: "rhe community is harmed by
the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevita-
ble loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the
courtroom engenders." Id. at 1427.
25. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
[Vol. 45:251
19941 A NEW PEREMPTORY INCLUSION 255
challenges for the purpose of excluding prospective jurors because
of their race.'
While the Batson limitation on peremptory challenges is a
necessary step towards eliminating discrimination in the courtroom,
the restriction also hinders the criminal defendant's ability to shape
the composition. of the jury in order to achieve an impartial and
representative jury. Ergo, the peremptory challenge has become a
double-edged sword to minority defendants.' As the Court noted
in Batson, the peremptory challenge once provided a cover for the
State to engage in the intentional and systematic exclusion of mi-
norities from the jury.'s The Court's decision in Batson helps to
eliminate the discrimination against defendants by prohibiting the
exclusion of jurors because of their shared race, but also prevents
the defendant from manipulating the composition of the jury pool
to place minority jurors on the petit jury. "In effect, we have exalt-
ed the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the crimi-
nal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who
faces imprisonment or even death."29
To protect the guarantee of a fair trial and impartial jury
under the Sixth Amendment, the criminal defendant needs a mech-
anism to include minority perspectives on the jury which will
achieve a representative panel. Many critics argue that the solution
is to either eliminate the peremptory challenge entirely,0 or to
26. While Batson prohibited the State's use of race-based peremptory challenges, the
same prohibition was extended to the defense's exercise of peremptory challenges in Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that the defendant's racially discrimi-
natory exercise of peremptory challenges violated the prospective juror's right to equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment). Recently, this prohibition has
also been extended to gender-based peremptory challenges. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1419,
1430.
27. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TL. L. REV. 1807, 1828-29 (1993) (discussing whether
the prohibition of race-based peremptory challenges benefits or hinders defendants in
assuring a nonbiased jury). "[Tihe unfettered discretion of the peremptory challenge can
be used either to conceal or to combat racism." Id. at 1828 (citing McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring)). The decisions following Batson that curtailed the
defense's use of peremptory challenges removed much of the benefit the challenge provid-
ed in the fight against racism. See id. at 1828-29.
28. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1986) (discussing the rationale be-
hind early efforts of the court to eradicate discriminatory peremptory challenges).
29. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
30. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03, 107-08 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing
that the peremptory challenge must be eliminated entirely to end discrimination in jury
selection). See infra note 198 and accompanying text (discussing alternatives to a random
jury selection method).
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achieve greater representativeness by affirmative selection of jurors
by the parties3' or by judicial enforcement of a system of racial
quotas.32 While all of these proposals disregard the important role
of the peremptory challenge in the current system, only the latter
two recognize the need for an inclusionary approach to jury selec-
tion.
This Note will propose a new peremptory inclusion which
provides a mechanism for the criminal defendant to create a more
representative jury without violating any prospective juror's right
against discriminatory exclusion. Part II reviews the Sixth Amend-
ment, the jury system in America, and the current method of jury
selection. Part III discusses the source and harm of racial discrimi-
nation in the jury system, the Court's response, and the conse-
quences to the current jury system of the Court's action. Part IV
analyzes the conflicting interests of prospective jurors and the
criminal defendant in attempting to remedy discriminatory practices.
Finally, this Note will suggest a new method of jury selection, the
peremptory inclusion, which will balance these interests and allow
the criminal defendant to create a more impartial and representative
jury.
II. THE JURY SYSTEM
The American colonists considered the guarantee of an inde-
pendent and impartial jury to be a fundamental right.33 In de-
claring independence from England, the colonists listed the depriva-
tion of trial by jury among their grievances against the King.'
31. See Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory
Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781, 802-12 (1986) (proposing a system of affirma-
tive selection that allows the parties to seat rather than exclude jurors).
32. See Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1691-708 (1985) (proposing a system of racial quotas in jury selection); see also
Diane Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J. 80,
82-95 (1973) (stating that current jury selection practices result in unrepresentative juries
of mostly white, middle-class citizens).
33. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 6. The Court recognized in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968), that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice." See generally, WILLIAM FORsYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1971)
(discussing the origins of the American jury).
34. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 6. The colonists believed that only a trial and verdict
by laypersons would prevent this abuse of government power. See Massaro, supra note 2,
at 508 (discussing the historical importance in America of the right to trial by jury). This
popular notion of justice culminated in the adoption of the Sixth Amendment to the Con-
stitution. Id. The supporters of the new Constitution referred to the jury as "a valuable
[Vol. 45:251
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Subsequently, in the drafting of the original Constitution in 1787,
the colonists provided for the guarantee of trial by jury for all
crimes, except impeachment." This guarantee is now protected by
the Sixth Amendment to the Bill of Rights which provides in part
that the accused shall have the right to a "trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."36
A. The Sixth Amendment
The constitutional guarantees of the Sixth Amendment belong
only to the criminal defendant.37 The Court emphasized the defen-
dant-centered interest of the Sixth Amendment in the following
passage:
The record of English and colonial jurisprudence outdating
the Constitution will be searched in vain for evidence that
trial by jury in criminal cases was regarded as a part of the
structure of government, as distinguished from a right or
privilege of the accused. On the contrary, it uniformly was
regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon the person
accused of crime for the purpose of safeguarding him
against the oppressive power of the King and the arbitrary
or partial judgment of the court.38
This protection is necessary owing to the unique plight of the
criminal defendant in the justice system and the possibility of
conviction and loss of liberty39 as a result of the jury's verdict.
safeguard to liberty" and "the palladium of free government." Id. at 508 n.44 (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 83, at 521-22 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961)).
35. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 7.
36. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The original constitutional provision provided for trial by
jury in the State where the crime had been committed. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 7.
This provision caused much concern during the ratification debates because of the broad
vicinage provision for state-wide juror selection. Id. The Sixth Amendment addressed this
concern by adding "district" to the vicinage. The term district, opposed to State, preserved
the colonists' commitment to local trials and juries. Id.
37. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 515 (stating that the right to a jury trial was, above
all else, the privilege of the accused).
38. Il at 516 n.91 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-97 (1930)).
39. The Court recognized the gravity of the consequences for criminal defendants in
asserting that, on appeal, the failure of the prosecutor to give a race-neutral explanation
after a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination requires reversal of petitioner's
conviction. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986); see also Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1967) (reversing the conviction of black defendants when the
prosecution could not offer a race-neutral explanation in response to a prima facie show-
25719941
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Because the liberty interest at stake is so significant, the Court has
long recognized the importance of the jury in the American system
of justice: "[Ilt is the jury that is a criminal defendant's fundamen-
tal 'protection of life and liberty against race or color preju-
dice.'"40
The Sixth Amendment ideally envisions a jury as a microcosm
of the community,41 but the Court has never interpreted this to
give a defendant the right to a jury "composed in whole or in part
of persons of his own race.142 However, while a defendant is only
guaranteed a fair possibility of a representative cross-section of the
community,43 he does have the right to a jury selected by non-
discriminatory criteria." According to one Justice, "[b]y compro-
mising the representative quality of the jury, discriminatory selec-
tion procedures make 'juries ready weapons for officials to oppress
those accused individuals who by chance are numbered among
unpopular or inarticulate minorities. ,','  To fully understand the
ing of discrimination); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (reversing the con-
viction of a Hispanic defendant on the grounds that there had not been a Hispanic juror
in Texas, a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463, 469 (1947) (reversing the conviction of a black defendant because there had been no
black jurors in the jurisdiction for 30 years and the prosecutor could not offer a sufficient
race-neutral explanation).
40. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879)).
41. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 494 (1990) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
42. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305). See also Hernandez,
347 U.S. at 482 (stating that a criminal defendant is not entitled to jurors of his or her
ethnic group, but is entitled to be tried by jurors from which members of ethnic groups
are not systematically excluded); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950) (stating
that the Constitution does not require a proportional representation of races on a jury, but
only a fair jury, selected without regard to race); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403
(1945) (holding that the mere fact that there was only one grand jury member of the
defendant's race is not proof, in and of itself, of discrimination); Martin v. Texas, 200
U.S. 316, 321 (1906) (holding that the allegation of discrimination by the criminal defen-
dant was not established simply by proving that no one of his race was on the grand or
petit juries); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881) (stating that the Constitution
does not require an ethnically mixed jury, simply one selected without discrimination).
The Court in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512 (1990) noted that a requirement of
representativeness on the basis of race would "distort the jury's reflection of other groups
in society, characterized by age, sex, ethnicity, religion, education level, or economic
class."
43. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493, 500 (1972)).
44. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
316, 321 (1906); Es parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)).
45. Id. at 87 n.8 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting)).
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consequence of these rights for the defendant, the concepts of
"impartiality," "jury of one's peers," and "cross-section of the
community" must be defined.4
These concepts underlying the Sixth Amendment have been
subject to extensive interpretation by the Supreme Court. While the
text of the amendment calls for "an impartial jury," the Court has
developed the additional requirements of "peers" and "cross-sec-
tion" from the history and purpose of the jury in our criminal
justice system. While there is some overlapping between the terms,
in some respects they are diametrically opposed.47 The balancing
of these concepts is necessary to achieve the requirement of a fair
jury.48
1. Impartiality
The right of impartiality under the Sixth Amendment is not so
much a guarantee of jury neutrality as it is an assurance of the
elimination of extreme partiality from the jury.49 "[An impartial
juror is not a completely neutral person, but is one who evidences
no extreme bias for or against the accused.""0 To achieve an im-
partial body, each juror is questioned for bias and ability to impar-
tially consider the evidence at trial.5 An "impartial juror is one
who will base a verdict on the evidence developed at the trial and
not on any preconceived notion about the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence."52 Because studies are inconclusive as to the correlation be-
tween a juror's race and any predisposition in deciding a case, 3
46. Massaro, supra note 2, at 542.
47. Id. Professor Massaro notes that a jury of one's peers may not be impartial or rep-
resent a cross-section of the community. Id, Similarly, an impartial jury may not include
one's peers or a cross-section of the community. Id.
48. Id. at 545. "A 'fair jury' is not merely a group of impartial fact finders, but is
one that is drawn from all sectors of the community and that includes some people who
are the defendant's peers." Id.
49. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. Massaro, supra note 2, at 544.
51. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (citing Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)). The Court has stated that "[t]he function of the [perempto-
ry] challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure
the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the
evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
52. Massaro, supra note 2, at 543.
53. See id. at 522-23 n.108 (discussing various studies on jurors and race); infra note
110 (listing several studies indicating a correlation between the racial composition of the
jury and the verdict).
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fitness to be a juror "is an individual rather than a group or class
matter."'  Impartiality, on the other hand, is strictly a group mat-
ter.55 No individual person is really impartial, but the gathering of
twelve persons can produce a "diffused impartiality"56 from the
heterogeneity of their experiences'and perceptions. 7 The Supreme
Court has also said that an impartial jury must be a representative
jury.58 To challenge a jury selection practice, a group must show
that without its inclusion, the jury will not be representative." The
Court has ruled that all racial or ethnic groups, as well as women,
are cognizable groups for the purposes of representativeness.'
2. Cross-Section of the Community
The Court originally announced the cross-section requirement in
Glasser v. United States.6 The Court defined a cross-sectional
jury as one that is drawn from a venire pool in which no distinc-
tive group is underrepresented due to systematic exclusion.62 The
cross-section requirement represents society's interest in popular
participation in the jury system. 3 To achieve this goal, the Court
prohibits systematic and intentional exclusions of groups and indi-
viduals from the jury pool.' However, the Court only requires
that jury pools, or venire pools, and not necessarily the petit jury,
54. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
55. "No individual is totally objective; all people have their own personal views and
experiences .... The jury is an attempt to minimize bias in all of us by drawing a
group of persons from the community and trusting that the combination of differing per-
spectives will balance out." VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at xiii.
56. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that the broad represen-
tative character of the jury is essential partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality).
57. Massaro, supra note 2, at 511. The ideal of impartiality is not that each juror
should be individually indifferent, rather that the jurors should be different from each
other. Babcock, supra note 9, at 552.
58. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
59. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 48.
60. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 478 (1954)).
61. 315 U.S. 60 (1986). In holding the exclusion of women who were not members of
the League of Women Voters from the jury venire unconstitutional, the Court stated that
"[t]he officials charged with choosing federal jurors ... must not allow the desire for
competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the concept of
the jury as a cross-section of the community." Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
62. Massaro, supra note 2, at 547 n.224 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
(1979)).
63. Id. at 545.
64. Id. at 547.
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represent a cross-section of the community.' By focusing on jury
procedures that wrongfully exclude individuals from the jury pool,
the Court has never required the affirmative inclusion of any indi-
vidual in order to meet the fair cross-section requirement."
3. Jury of One's Peers
The last and perhaps most debated concept of a fair jury is a
jury of one's peers.67 The original right to a "jury of one's peers"
was a special right of an elite social class to be tried by their
associates.' This concept was broadened by the colonists69 and
defined by the Court in Strauder v. West Virginia.7" In the words
of Strauder, "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body of men composed
of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associ-
ates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which
he holds."'
Literally interpreted, this defines all American citizens who are
over the age of eighteen and have not been convicted of a felony
as being legal equals to all other similar Americans.72 A narrower
interpretation of "peers" presupposes a common characteristic be-
tween the accused and a juror which enables the juror to under-
stand the defendant better than others who do not possess the
shared trait.'
A peer should not be confused with a friend of the accused,74
but rather is one who can empathize with the defendant in making
the determination of guilt or innocence.75 The capacity to empa-
65. Massaro, supra note 2, at 529.
66. Id.
67. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
68. Massaro, supra note 2, at 505. The Magna Carta's guarantee of "judgement of his
peers" for all freemen was to ensure that the barons would be tried by their associates, or
sectatores, and not by the king's judges who were ecclesiastics. Id. at 505 n.17.
69. See supra note 36 (discussing concern over broad vicinage provision of the original
right to trial by jury and compromise in the Bill of Rights to ensure local jury selection).
70. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
71. Id. at 308.
72. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 9.
73. Massaro, supra note 2, at 54849. This perspective has an English historical tra-
dition in the ancient jury de medietate linguae which guaranteed foreign litigants the right
to a jury half composed of persons from his country. Id. at 550. A jury de medietate
linguae was also granted to Jews to protect the Crown's property interest in Jews and
their effects. Id. at 550 n.238.
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id.; see also FUKURAr, supra note 1, at 142-43 (arguing that especially from a de-
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thize is important because jurors make subjective decisions on the
credibility of witnesses and circumstantial weight of evidence.
Consequently, these evaluations may differ according to the juror's
experiences.76 Although it is difficult to determine who is a peer,
immutable characteristics such as race and gender are both recog-
nizable as well as important to the visual image and acceptance of
the jury by both the defendant and society.'
B. Modem Jury Selection
The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 196878 is a
statutory attempt to implement the Court's decisions interpreting
the Sixth Amendment guarantees of a fair and impartial jury. The
Act states, in part: "It is the policy of the United States that all
litigants in the Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the
right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the
court convenes." '79
Although juror requirements historically have been designed to
exclude certain groups of persons as unqualified to serve as ju-
rors,8" the Act outlaws special requirements for federal jurors"
fense counsel's point of view, jurors should be in "emotional sympathy" with the
defendant's life condition). Understanding the defendant's motivation is not only important
for the determination of guilt or innocence but also in making a sentencing decision. Id.
76. Massaro, supra note 2, at 552.
77. There are some cases in which it is clear in the eyes of observers that racism has
influenced the jury verdict and the "transparency of those cases is far more traumatic than
the knowledge we derive from statistics." Herman, supra note 27, at 1809. The recent
riots in Miami and Los Angeles following the acquittals of police officers by all-white
juries accused of beating and killing black arrestees, support the need for affirmative in-
clusion of minorities on petit juries to support the legitimacy of verdicts in racially moti-
vated cases. See id. at 1810 (discussing the Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of
two police officers charged with beating motorist Rodney King); see also Rodger L.
Hochman, Note, Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw,
17 NOVA L. REv. 1367, 1394-95 (1993) (noting the extent of property damage and the
number of lives lost as a result of riots in Los Angeles, and Miami following the acquit-
tal of police officers who beat Arthur McDuffie to death after his arrest for a traffic
violation).
78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (1988) [hereinafter "the Act"].
79. Id. § 1861 (emphasis added).
80. Historically excluded groups include blacks, women, foreigners, nonfreeholders,
uneducated persons, and low income persons. See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at
13-16 (outlining the history of juror requirements).
81. Id. at 16. Most states have enacted similar legislation to prevent discriminatory
exclusion of otherwise eligible jurors. See id. at 86 (stating that in recent years most state
courts have made changes similar to the Federal Act and now randomly select jurors from
a standard list).
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and directs jurors to be selected randomly from extensive venire
pools.8 2
Jury selection begins with the compilation of a venire pool of
eligible persons to serve as jurors. 3 The primary source for the
venire is voter lists," which is to be supplemented by other lists
when needed to produce a fair cross-section of the community."
By compiling a list of eligible jurors and selecting randomly from
the list there are only minimal opportunities for discrimination in
the selection of the venire pool.86 However, a truly random selec-
tion procedure would interfere with the impartiality criterion be-
cause it would permit persons with overt prejudices and biases to
be impaneled. Thus, to balance cross-representativeness with impar-
tiality the parties need a method of excluding jurors who are inca-
pable of deliberating impartially. The final stage of jury selection
satisfies this need by allowing the parties to challenge jurors from
the venire pool until a petit jury is impaneledY In addition, the
participation by the parties in selecting the jury enhances both the
defendant's and the community's acceptance of the verdict.8
82. Id at 16-17.
83. Id at 24, 85; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
"venire" as the "group of citizens from whom a jury is chosen in a given case"); see
generally VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 85-109 (discussing the process of list compilation
according to the Act and various state statutes). Eligibility to serve as a juror only re-
quires satisfaction of certain minimal requirements. See JODY GEORGE Er AL., THE FEDER-
AL JuDIcIAL CENTER, HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN THE FEDERAL DIsTRIcT COuRTS 24-26
(1989) (outlining the requirements for jury service). After the court compiles a list of all
eligible jurors, the court then grants "excuses" to jurors who are unable to serve due to
health problems, economic hardship, work, or other responsibilities. See generally VAN
DYKE, supra note 6, at 111-37 (discussing the various "excuses" for which potential ju-
rors are relieved of jury duty). The "excuse" stage of jury selection actually involves
three separate procedures: disqualifications, automatic exemptions, and discretionary excus-
es. 1d at 111.
84. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 88.
85. Id at 94 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1989)). The most common supplemental
list is the list of holders of driver licenses. Id at 99. Other possible sources include cen-
sus lists, lists of Social Security numbers, and persons who have filed income tax returns.
11. at 99-100.
86. Id. at 18.
87. While the federal courts and many state courts use a twelve-person petit jury, the
Court has upheld the constitutionality of a six-person jury for criminal cases in Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100-02 (1970) (holding that a twelve-person requirement is not
an indispensable part of the Sixth Amendment).
88. Massaro, supra note 2, at 513-14.
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C. Voir Dire and Party Challenges
Challenges are a negative kind of selection89 which allow the
parties to eliminate prospective jurors they believe will be unfavor-
able to their case in hopes of replacing them with more favorable
jurors.' Parties exercise their challenges against prospective jurors
during voir dire, which allows venirepersons to be questioned by
the parties9' in order to expose bias or prejudice which may affect
their impartiality.92 Voir dire is designed to elicit information
about each prospective juror's life experiences and how these expe-
riences relate to the case.93
There are two types of party challenges. The first type, the
challenge for cause, provides for disqualification on narrow legal
grounds" based on a juror's specific bias.9' This mechanism al-
lows parties to construct an impartial jury by removing jurors with
demonstrable partiality to the other side.96 However, during voir
dire, prospective jurors may deceive the court about their prejudic-
es or be reluctant to admit to harboring prejudices,' obliging the
89. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 140.
90. Id. For the minority defendant, the exercise of challenges helps to "even out" a
disproportionate representation of a population group on the venire and increases the like-
lihood that a minority juror will serve on the jury. Id. at 139.
91. In many jurisdictions, including federal court, voir dire questioning is conducted by
the judge. Babcock, supra note 9, at 548 (discussing various methods of voir dire).
92. See generally id. at 545 (discussing the purpose and benefit of voir dire).
93. FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 154. In many cases, voir dire has been expanded from
simple intuition to a complex application of computers and statistical techniques. See id.
at 141-64; see also WALTER F. ABBOTT, ANALYTIC JUROR RATER (1987) (suggesting a
value scale to rank jurors and assist in the exercise of party challenges).
Personal characteristics are considered relevant indicators of the prospective juror's
partiality to one side or the other. FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 141; see ROBERT A.
WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 62 (2d ed. 1989) (listing a ranking by experi-
enced trial lawyers of relevant factors in jury selection). Many experienced lawyers con-
sider personal characteristics, occupation, personality, and race, in that order, to be "ex-
tremely important" in jury selection. Id. at 64. Physical signs, nationality, body language,
gender, and age were described as "important." Id.
94. The legal grounds for disqualification are statutorily authorized. VAN DYKE, supra
note 6, at 143. Commonly recognized grounds include present or prior relationships with
a party to the case, a witness, or an attorney, knowledge of the facts of the case, previ-
ously serving in a related case, or preconceived opinion of guilt or innocence or the
opinion on the merits of the case. Id.
95. Challenges for cause require a showing of specific bias that interferes with impar-
tial consideration of the case at hand. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 139; see also
FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 154.
96. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 140.
97. See Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 839; Babcock, supra note 9, at 547, 554 (sug-
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court to accept the juror's pledge of impartiality." A second type
of challenge, the peremptory challenge, provides protection from
this danger of juror deception."
The peremptory challenge is most commonly used to remove a
juror whom a party suspects is biased but against whom the party
does not have sufficient grounds to support a challenge for
cause."°° While challenges for cause can be exercised without lim-
itation, subject only to the approval of the presiding judge, peremp-
tory challenges are limited in number by statute."0'
The Constitution does not guarantee the exercise of peremptory
challenges but the Court traditionally has viewed the challenge as a
"necessary part of trial by jury.''" °2 The challenge is considered
necessary to achieve an impartial jury by providing the opportunity
to remove a prospective juror whose prejudices may not have been
revealed by normal questioning but may have been exhibited in the
appearance and demeanor of the juror.0 3 Historically the peremp-
tory challenge has been permitted "for any reason at all, as long as
that reason is related to ... the outcome" of the case." 4 Follow-
ing this tradition, attorneys have developed jury selection strategies
designed to create homogenized juries favorable to their cases by
striking jurors according to their group membership. 5 Recently,
gesting that jurors may be ashamed to admit biases, or may intentionally deceive the
court to avoid being removed).
98. See Babcock, supra note 9, at 549-50. If a juror states that he or she would de-
cide the case only on the evidence presented, judges are reluctant to impugn the
credibility of this professed impartial juror. Id. at 550.
99. See VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 168 (stating that peremptory challenges allow
each side to eliminate people suspected of holding extreme views). Peremptory challenges
also enable a party to remove a juror who may be resentful against the party for any
personal or intrusive questions during voir dire. Id. at 163.
100. Id. at 146.
101. IL at 145.
102. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Ken-
tucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In the opinion, Justice White outlines the historical significance
of the peremptory challenge as an important means of assuring the selection of an unbi-
ased and impartial jury. Swain, 476 U.S. at 212-19.
103. See 4 WnLm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (D. Berkowitz & S. Thome eds.
1978). Blackstone explains that peremptory challenges are essential because a juror's bias
may be insufficient to qualify as a challenge for cause, and intrusive questioning of the
juror may result in resentment by the juror. Il
104. United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated and
remanded sub nom. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
105. See, e.g., Robert L. Harris, Jr., Redefining the Harm of Peremptory Challenges, 32
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1027, 1028 (1991). It is generally believed by lawyers and re-
searchers that homogeneity among jurors is likely to result in conformity to the majority
view during deliberations. See MICHAEL FRIED Er AL., Juror Selection: An Analysis of
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the discretion to arbitrarily strike prospective jurors has been limit-
ed by the Supreme Court. In Batson v. Kentucky,"°e the Court
prohibited the exercise of peremptory challenges made on the as-
sumption that members of defendant's race as a group are not
qualified to serve as jurors. °" The Court also held in J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B."'0 that gender is an unconstitutional proxy
for jury impartiality.
Ill. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE JURY-BOX
Race historically has played a major role in jury selection,
especially where the criminal defendant is a member of a racial
minority.9 The exclusion of minorities rests on the assumption
that acculturated racial prejudice and attitudes tend to predispose
jurors to a particular verdict."0 Although we aspire to be a soci-
ety in which race is irrelevant,"' this is only an ideal, not reali-
t.112ty. n
The Court began its "unceasing efforts to eradicate racial dis-
crimination" from the jury-box over a century ago."' In Strauder
v. West Virginia,"' the Court found that a black defendant was
denied equal protection when he was tried by a jury from which
Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 47, 51 (R. Simon
ed. 1975) (stating that selection of jurors is based on the differential aims of the plaintiff
and the defendant); WENKE, supra note 93, at 77 (noting that groups of similarly situated
people tend to possess similar views); Massaro, supra note 2, at 549 (noting that differ-
ences among groups of people may affect their perceptions).
106. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
107. Id. at 86.
108. 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994).
109. FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 156.
110. Id. Several jury research studies indicate a correlation between the racial compo-
sition of the jury and the verdict. See Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 834 (citing
Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133 (1979)) (stating that race does play a role in a
person's personal perception); Johnson, supra note 32, at 1611 (showing a correlation
between racial composition of the jury and race of the defendant). But see John R. Hep-
burn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury Selection, 4
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 95 (1980) (finding no relationship between juror race and the
verdict); Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Comment, Reviewing the Empirical Evidence on Jury Racism:
Findings of Discrimination or Discriminatory Findings?, 69 NEB. L. REV. 230 (1990)
(suggesting that jurors are capable of setting aside personal biases); see also WILLIAM
WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1987).
111. Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 835.
112. Id.
113. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
114. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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members of his race had been purposefully excluded.1 '5 The
Court declared that "[t]he very idea of a jury is a body ... com-
posed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is select-
ed or summoned to determine."'".6 Racially-based selection proce-
dures violate equal protection when they are used to exclude per-
sons from the jury venire' 7 or the petit jury. on the basis of
race. While venire pools can be secured against discrimination by
random selection methods, the peremptory challenge remains an
impenetrable shield for discrimination. "Racism in the criminal
justice system hides behind discretion,"".9  and the peremptory
challenge provides the perfect cover for discriminatory jury selec-
tion practices.
The Court first addressed this concern in Swain v. Ala-
bama."4  In this case, the prosecutor exercised the state's pe-
remptory challenges to strike all six black venirepersons.'2 Al-
though the Court rejected the defendant's claim of purposeful dis-
crimination by the prosecutor," the Court recognized that the
115. Id. at 310. The Court struck down the state statute which only qualified white
persons for jury duty. Id.
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied . . all
right to participate . . . as jurors, because of their color, though they are citi-
zens, and may be in other aspects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon
them . . . an assertion of their inferiority, and stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id. at 308.
116. Id. 'at 308.
117. Id. at 305; see also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1967) (per curiam)
(finding that the process of drawing names from lists designating race results in racially
disproportionate inclusion into the jury pool); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 549-55
(1967) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would not
allow to stand a conviction resulting from a procedure which created an all-white jury);
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (determining that the absence of any black
juror in a 60-member panel violated the petitioner's right to equal protection).
118. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); see also Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S.
316, 319 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1880).
119. Herman, supra note 27, at 1808.
120. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). Defendant, Robert Swain, was a black man indicted and convicted of rape, and
sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203.
121. Swain, 380 U.S. at 210.
122. The Court required a black defendant to show that the system was "being pervert-
ed" by the striking of potential black jurors by the prosecutor in repeated cases. Id. at
223-24. In failing to make this prima facie case of purposeful and systematic discrimina-
tion, the Court simply relied on the presumption that the prosecutor did not discriminate.
Id. at 221-22.
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"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to [blacks] on account of
race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause."'"
Under the rule of Swain, the defendant's challenge to the exer-
cise of race-based peremptory challenges required empirical proof
that the prosecutor had engaged in systematic exclusion of blacks
in case after case. This standard proved to be almost impossi-
ble to surmount."z While the Swain Court was willing to recog-
nize a right to community-based racial diversity on juries, it was
unwilling to vindicate the individual defendant's right to be tried
by a racially diverse jury in a particular case. It was over twenty
years before the Court decided to reevaluate this "crippling burden
of proof."'"1
A. Batson v. Kentucky
Batson involved a challenge to the prosecutor's use of his
peremptory challenges to strike all four black venirepersons As
a result of the prosecutor's actions, the jury selected was composed
of all white persons.'28 The defense objected to the peremptory
strikes on the grounds that the removal of all black veniremen
violated the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment's guar-
antee of a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community and
the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the
laws. 29 The judge denied the motion, stating that the cross-sec-
tion requirement applied only to the venire selection. 3° The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky affirmed the decision of the trial judge,
holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate systematic exclu-
123. Id. at 203-04.
124. Herman, supra note 27, at 1818 n.50 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24).
125. Only two challenges succeeded under the Swain burden of proof. See State v.
Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1162-64 (La. 1979) (basing its finding of systematic exclu-
sion on both empirical evidence and the prosecutur's admission); State v. Brown, 371 So.
2d 751, 754 (La. 1979) (finding systematic exclusion demonstrated in a series of cases by
a single prosecutor over a seven year period).
126. The Court termed the evidentiary burden in Swain a "crippling burden of proof'
because it was virtually impossible for an individual defendant to overcome. Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
127. Id. at 83. Batson was a black man indicted on charges of second-degree burglary
and receipt of stolen goods. Id. at 82. Under the state statute, the prosecutor had six
peremptory challenges. Id. at 83 n.2.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 83.
130. Id.
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sion of black jurors from the venire, as required by Swain v. Ala-
bama.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reevaluate the
evidentiary burden required under Swain.'
The Court declared that a single invidiously discriminatory
exercise of a peremptory challenge is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.' "For evidentiary requirements to dictate the
'several must suffer discrimination' before one could object would
be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection for all. ' ' "M
The Court also lessened the burden on the defendant to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. 3' If the defendant's
showing is successful, the burden then shifts to the State to give a
race-neutral explanation for the exclusion of the juror.3 ' While
the reason does not have to rise to the level of a challenge for
cause,'37 the prosecutor is prohibited from challenging a juror "on
the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that [the juror] would
be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.' ' 38 Al-
though the Court chose to leave the implementation of this rule to
the lower courts, 39 it did provide some guidelines for what con-
stitutes an acceptable race-neutral reason."4°
131. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1986).
132. Id. at 84, 90.
133. Id. at 95-96.
134. Id. (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting)).
13-5. The Court laid out a three-part test:
To establish such a case [of purposeful discrimination], the defendant first must
show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, . . . and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire mem-
bers of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the
fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute
a jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind
to discriminate." . . . Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any
other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.
Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
136. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94, 97 (1986).
137. Id. at 97.
138. Id. The Court argues that "[tlhe core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citi-
zens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were
we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise
solely from the jurors' race." Id. at 97-98.
139. Id at 99.
140. Id. at 98. The prosecutor may not rebut a prima facie case of discrimination by
merely denying any discriminatory motive, id, or by arguing "good faith" in assessing an
individual juror's competence. Id. (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632
(1972)).
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B. A Race-Neutral Reason
To successfully rebut a prima facie case under Batson, the
prosecutor must articulate a race-neutral reason "related to the
particular case to be tried."'14 The Court illustrated the boundaries
of this test by stating that a neutral explanation does not include a
mere denial of a discriminatory motive, or an assertion of good
faith in exercising the challenge. 42 In addition, an explanation
based on the prosecutor's intuitive judgment that the venireperson
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race is
not permissible.'43
The Court attempted to further clarify its position on the per-
missible use of peremptory challenges in Hernandez v. New
York.' 44 In this case the Court upheld the prosecutor's exercise of
peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors because of their
bilingualism. 45 The majority found bilingualism to be a neutral
explanation despite the disproportionate impact on Hispanic mem-
bers of the venire pool. 146 The Court stated that "[u]nless a dis-
criminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral."' 47 As a result of this
decision, courts now are authorized to accept facially neutral ex-
planations, without investigating further into the prosecutor's mo-
tive. 4
8
Critics of the Court's decisions in Batson and Hernandez argue
that the Court's concern with the fair process of jury selection is
141. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 97.
144. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
145. Id. at 361, 372. In this case, the defendant was Hispanic as were most of the
defense's witnesses. The prosecutor stated that he had doubts as to whether the Hispanic
jurors would accept the interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said by the defendant
and the witnesses on the stand. Id. at 356-57.
146. Id. at 361.
147. Id. at 360.
148. Stephanie Goldberg, Batson and the Straight-Face Test, 78 A.B.A.J., Aug. 1992, at
82. Examples of courts' new lax approach to discrimination include: United States v.
Payne, 962 F.2d 1228, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 811 (1992) (upholding
peremptory strike of juror because he was a member of the NAACP); Goodman v. Lands
End Homeowners Assoc. of Hilton Head, Inc., No. 91-2542 (4th Cir. 1992) (allowing
peremptory challenge against a male juror in a personal injury case because he was "ef-
feminate"); Williams v. Rader, 1992 WL 54728, at *2 (E.D. La.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
821 (1992) (accepting peremptory challenge against a juror who continually looked at the
defendant and defendant's mother, suggesting he might sympathize with the defendant).
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insufficient to secure equal protection for both the criminal defen-
dant and the prospective juror49 because it does not protect
against the judges' and counsels' subconscious prejudice."' 0 In
Batson, Justice Marshall argued that facially neutral reasons based
on demeanor were insufficient because the trial judge is not able to
evaluate those reasons for actual motive of the prosecutor."'
While the peremptory challenge will always be an essentially sub-
jective exercise of discretion, the courts need some objective crite-
ria to assist in evaluating the prosecutor's reasons in order to guar-
antee that equal protection is served. 52
The Batson decision was the Court's first substantial step to-
149. See Herman, supra note 27, at 1814 (referring to subsequent Supreme Court cases
which clarify that Batson protects the rights of the prospective juror as opposed to the
defendant's right to be free of discrimination). See also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-57 (1980) (discussing the difficulty in
determining whether an unconstitutional motivation influenced a decision).
150. The limitation placed on peremptory challenges simply shifts the discretion to re-
move a juror from the parties to the judge. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing concern over the danger of a prosecutor's
conscious or unconscious racism that may lead him or her to perceive a prospective black
juror's demeanor negatively and a judge's racism that may accept the strike). Justice
Stevens, dissenting in Hernandez, noted that means less drastic than juror exclusion are
available to ensure compliance. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 379 (1991)
(suggesting use of limiting instruction or use of headphones to only allow jurors to hear
the interpreter and not the witness). The Court has previously held that availability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives is evidence of discriminatory motive. Albermarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
151. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-06. "If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to
discharge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory." Id. at 106.
152. In Batson, the Court drew from its Title VII decisions in establishing the burden
of proof rules for jury selection cases. Following this precedent, the Court in Batson re-
quired the prosecutor to "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to
be tried." id. at 98. In addition, "the prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Id. at 98
n.20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
Several jurisdictions have implemented a similar fact-based standard by requiring a
rational basis for the exercise of the peremptory challenge. See People v. Green, 561
N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (Westchester County 1990) (requiring a rational basis in the exercise
of a peremptory challenge against a hearing-impaired juror). See also People v. Furman,
404 N.W.2d 246, 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that a rational basis is required for
the exercise of peremptory challenges); Odom v. State, 355 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (Miss.
1978) (stating that the facts obtained in voir dire provide the rational basis upon which to
challenge a juror); Murray v. State, 713 P.2d 202, 211 (Wyo. 1986) (stating that before a
peremptory challenge is made there should be some rational basis for the exclusion of the
juror). But while a rational basis test requires a reason well-founded in fact, many race-
neutral reasons based on demeanor are not founded in fact. The judge is not competent to
assess the prosecutor's credibility and veracity in deciding whether or not to accept the
explanation for the exercise.
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wards eliminating discrimination in the jury-box by placing a re-
striction on the exercise of peremptory challenges. 53 However, in
allowing the courts to implement the Batson rule according to their
local jury selection practices, the prohibition on racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges has become a "vain and illuso-
ry" guarantee of equal protection in the courtroom.'15 "Discrimi-
nation may no longer hide behind the peremptory challenge, but it
only has to move one small step to hide behind the race-neutral
explanation."' 56 Because the danger of discrimination still exists
in the jury-box, there is a need for other jury selection mechanisms
to protect the criminal defendant's interest in a fair and impartial
jury.
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUAL PROTECTION AND
IMPARTIALITY
Both society and the defendant have an interest in removing
racial discrimination from the jury-box but these interests are not
necessarily coexistent. The defendant's interest is a personal interest
in receiving a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.' 7 The soci-
etal interest, on the other hand, is a collective interest in preventing
discrimination based on race or group affiliation.'58 The Court
chose to pursue the equal protection approach to jury selection in
Batson'59  and later cases"W rather than addressing the
153. See supra notes 127-140 and accompanying text (discussing Batson ruling).
154. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (discussing the Court's confidence that trial judges in
supervising voir dire can decide whether a peremptory challenge is based on discriminato-
ry motives).
155. See Herman, supra note 27, at 1830-31 (stating that Batson's ruling better serves
the equality rights of jurors than it does defendants', although it even fails to serve the
jurors' rights very well); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J. concurring) ("If
such easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's obligation to
justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court today
may be illusory.").
156. See Herman, supra note 27, at 1830-31.
157. For the criminal defendant, everything about the trial is personal because his or her
life and/or liberty is at stake. Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 829.
158. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (noting that "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selec-
tion extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the
entire community.").
159. Herman describes the Court's rationale in Batson and later cases as embracing the
representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review as espoused by John Ely. Herman,
supra note 27, at 1814. This theory states that the proper reviewing role of the courts is
to guarantee fair and equal access for all groups to the decision-making process, and then
to defer to the decision made by the normal functioning of the process. Id. at 1814 (cit-
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defendant's Sixth Amendment right because of the desirability of a
colorblind approach.'
The appeal of a colorblind approach is rooted in the Court's
finding that the use of race as the basis for any classification is
objectionable because of the stigmatizing effect of racial stereo-
types." However, while potential jurors have the right not to be
excluded on the basis of their race, the criminal defendant's right
to a fair and impartial jury is a more pressing right that justifies
the use of peremptory challenges to ensure a racially inclusive
jury." In Georgia v. McCollum,64  the Court considered
whether the interests served by Batson are secondary to the rights
of a criminal defendant." The Court held that purposeful dis-
ing ELY, supra note 149, at 135-57). The Court in Batson ensures access to the jury by
minority members without requiring more assurance of a fair verdict.
160. The Court has adopted an equal protection approach to allow for the extension of
the Batson rule to civil litigants. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614
(1991); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (extending the rule to
criminal defendants); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (extending
the rule to gender-based peremptory challenges).
To extend the restriction against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, the
Court had to find the exercise of a peremptory challenge by the defense counsel to be a
state action. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619. Justice O'Connor states in her McCollum dissent
that previous decisions firmly establish that criminal defendants are not state actors under
the Fourteenth Amendment when performing traditional trial functions. McCollum, 112 S.
Ct. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing cases that discuss the relationship between
defendants and government at trial). See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325
(1981) (holding that a public defender is not a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "when
performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding").
161. Herman, supra note 27, at 1824-25 (surveying affirmative action cases and the
Court's inclination to avoid race-conscious remedies in favor of colorblindness).
162. See Herman, supra note 27, at 1826. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (discussing the stigmatizing effect of racial discrimination on the black communi-
ty); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ('To separate [black students]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.").
163. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972):
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from
jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human na-
ture and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case that may be presented.
Id. at 503-04.
164. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
165. Id. at 2357-58.
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crimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges by either party
is unlawful." In other words, the Court found that the rights of
the prospective jurors preempt the criminal defendant's rights to
exercise peremptory challenges to shape the composition of the
jury.167
The Court introduced its nonexclusion theory to jury selection
in Strauder.'6  In this decision, and several subsequent deci-
sions, 69 the Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the exclusion of black males
from jury pools. 170 The Court's focus in these cases was not so
much the fairness of the jury as the doctrines of "equality, emanci-
pation, and nondiscrimination."' 7' It was not until the 1940s that
the Court began to describe a fair jury in terms of a representative
body.' In Glasser v. United States, 73 the Court supported the
cross-representativeness theory in a Sixth Amendment challenge to
the exclusion from a petit jury of women who were not members
of the League of Women Voters. The Court stated that jury
officials should not make selections that "'do not comport with the
concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community."""
Since this decision, the Court has continued the concept of cross-
representativeness as an "essential component of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial.' 76
Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene Countyt" was the first
166. Id. at 2359.
167. Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring). "In effect, [the Court has] exalted the right
of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the
defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death." Id.
168. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 530 (describing the three cases in which the Su-
preme Court first applied the nonexclusion approach to jury selection cases).
169. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (addressing the propriety of a
petition by two black defendants for removal from the state court to the federal system,
based on allegations that the grand and petit juries were all white and that defendants
were entitled to a jury that included some black members); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1879) (denying a writ of habeas corpus to the petitioner, a judge who was charged
with using race as a factor to select jurors for petit and grand juries).
170. Massaro, supra note 2, at 530.
171. Id. at 531.
172. Id. at 532. Justice Black described the jury as a body "truly representative of the
community" in Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
173. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
174. Massaro, supra note 2, at 532.
175. Id. at 533 (citing Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1986)).
176. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975)).
177. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
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case which gave a group of individuals, other than defendants,
standing to bring suit for being denied the right to serve on a
jury. 7 ' In Carter, Justice Stewart wrote for the Court: "Whether
jury service be deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State
may no more extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to oth-
ers on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the
offering and withholding of the elective franchise."' 79 The com-
parison of jury service with the right to vote is significant because
the right to vote has been described as a 'fundamental right' by
the Court.' "A 'fundamental right' is a right so basic to our
democratic government that the government must ensure the equal
access of all citizens to it; all discrimination affecting access to the
right must be eliminated unless justified by some 'compelling state
interest.""' . The recognition of jury service as a fundamental
right is important in development of equal protection rights because
it prevents the infringement of the right for mere administrative
convenience.
Under Batson, the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause
forbid counsel to strike a potential juror "on the false assumption
that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as
jurors."'82 While only state actions constitute violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment," the Court in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. extended this ban on racially discriminatory peremp-
tory challenges to cover counsel for civil litigants."84  In
Edmonson, the Court concluded that the courtroom is a "real ex-
178. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 58. The appellants in the case were black citizens of
Greene County, Alabama, who commenced a class action against the officials charged
with administration of the jury selection laws of the state. Carter, 396 U.S. at 321. The
District Court found that the county's methods for obtaining names of eligible jurors
systematically excluded blacks from the jury roll. Id. at 324-27.
179. Carter, 396 U.S. at 330.
180. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 75. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360
(1972) (holding that the state's durational residence requirement excluded too many people
and did not serve adequately the state's interest in an informed electorate); Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (ruling the state's imposition of a poll
tax unconstitutional because wealth or property, like race, bears no relation to voter quali-
fication).
181. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 72-73.
182. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). The Court has also held that gender-
based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause by serving to perpetuate
archaic stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426-28 (1994).
183. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1990).
184. Id. at 630.
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pression of the constitutional authority of the government" and thus
"[t]o permit racial exclusion in this official forum compounds the
racial insult in judging a citizen by the color of his or her
skin." 5 This doctrinal extension indicates the great significance
that the Court places on the rights of prospective jurors.
But unconscious racism affects everyone in the courtroom 86
and therefore may also affect the verdict.'87 Chief Justice Burger,
in his Batson dissent, recognized the conflict between the psycho-
logical reality of race-consciousness and the utopian ideal of a
colorblind society. 8 The major function of the peremptory chal-
lenge in the modem jury system is to reconcile our understanding
that members of groups possess similar characteristics with our de-
sire to treat people as individuals and not simply as members of
groups.'89 So, while a colorblind approach to party challenges
serves jurors, it disserves defendants.t"o
V. FIGHTING DISCRIMINATION AFTER BATSON
Because the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment trump the common law practice of peremp-
tory challenges, many critics believe that the challenge should be
185. Id. at 628.
186. Herman, supra note 27, at 1822. Unconscious racism "may often have subtle ef-
fects on our judgments about who is telling the truth or who looks dangerous." Id.
(footnote omitted). Although colorblindness achieves the goals of equality, the Court ap-
parently refuses to recognize that "real jurors in the real world" are not colorblind. Id. at
1825.
187. See id. at 1823 (arguing that jurors may be unconsciously affected by racism even
though they and others consider themselves fair).
188. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger believes that the unexplained peremptory challenge strengthens the jury sys-
tem and relies on arguments by Babcock:
The peremptory, made without giving any reason, avoids trafficking in the core
of truth in most common stereotypes . . . . Common human experience, com-
mon sense, psychosociological studies, and public opinion polls tell us that it is
likely that certain classes of people statistically have predispositions that would
make them inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases . . . . [W]e have
evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression
of what we dare not say but know is true more often than not.
Id. (quoting Babcock, supra note 9, at 553-54).
189. Babcock, supra note 9, at 553.
190. Herman, supra note 27, at 1828. Some commentators argue that regardless of the
effect the racial composition of the jury has on the verdict, the defendant's belief that the
jury was fair and impartial is by itself an important objective. See Babcock, supra note 9,
at 552.
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abolished entirely."9 Justice Marshall advocated this alternative in
Batson v. Kentucky, stating that elimination of the peremptory chal-
lenge is the only way to end racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion." But a truly random selection procedure would interfere
with the impartiality of a fair jury because it would permit persons
with overt prejudices and biases to be selected. 93 The exercise of
party challenges are necessary to assure that biased jurors are not
impaneled."g However, under a system of cause challenges only,
the Sixth Amendment's criterion for a fair jury is not satisfied
either because there is no mechanism to secure peer representa-
tion. 5 By extending the Batson limitation to the defense's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges in Georgia v. McCollum,9 ' the
Court constrained the criminal defendant's ability to fight discrimi-
191. For discussions of the evolving caselaw in jury selection and the case for abolish-
ing peremptory challenges, see Hochman, supra note 77, at 1367 (arguing that the pe-
remptory challenge should be abolished as incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease
but Killing the Patient, 1987 SUiP. Cr. REV. 97, 134-44 (criticizing the Court's evolving
law of jury discrimination as creating a costly and time-consuming system of judicial re-
view which fails to provide any corresponding benefit); cf, Barbara D. Underwood, End-
ing Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right is It, Anyway?, 93 CoLuM. L.
REV. 725, 760-73 (1992) (arguing that the Court's modified peremptory challenge under
Batson and Hernandez is worth preserving and will not result in a heavy burden if prop-
erly administered).
192. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall expressed
concern that the difficulty of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination will allow
the continued illegitimate use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 105. As an example, Justice
Marshall suggests a prosecutor will feel no reservation in striking black jurors in a case
where only one or two blacks survive the challenges for cause. Id. ("Prosecutors are left
free to discriminate against blacks in jury selection provided that they hold that discrimi-
nation to an 'acceptable level'."). Justice Marshall also suggests that trial judges will be
forced to accept readily generated explanations for the exercise of the challenges. Id. at
106 ("Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and tri-
al courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons.").
193. If courts abolished peremptory challenges entirely, jurors would be selected random-
ly. The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act views random selection as an ideal prac-
tice. See VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 84-85. However, it is not an adequate method of
achieving a representative jury. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (discussing
the underrepresentation of minorities on venire lists and the low statistical likelihood of a
minority juror being randomly seated on a jury). Moreover, the homogenized result from
random selection will not enhance the legitimacy of the jury as does a selection practice
that allows for an element of party choice in the seating of jurors.
194. Massaro, supra note 2, at 545 (stating that party challenges and voir dire are pro-
cedures that protect the defendant's interest in impartial jurors).
195. Cf Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2364 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(supporting the use of unrestricted peremptory challenges by the defense as the most
effective method to secure minority representation and overcome racial bias on the jury).
196. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
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nation to the fullest extent once allowed under the Sixth Amend-
ment. Consequently, the defendant is unarmed to secure peer repre-
sentation to secure an impartial jury."9
Another proposed alternative is a system of affirmative selec-
tion of jurors.'98 Affirmative selection allows parties to list, in
order of preference, twelve jurors from a twenty-four person veni-
re." Under this method, the judge would first impanel any juror
listed on both parties' list, and then would alternate between the
lists, seating a selected juror in descending preferential order until
the panel was complete.' ° Because this system is based on the
selection of a jury favorable to both parties, as opposed to avoid-
ing an unfavorable jury, it increases the legitimacy of the verdict
to both the parties and to society."' Affirmative selection also
creates a more representative panel by reflecting a broad spectrum
of viewpoints and biases. 22 However, while affirmative selection
promotes the cross-sectional and peer representation requisites of a
fair jury, it fails to assure impartiality by allowing the selection of
jurors with extreme partiality.2 3
Another critical concern of reform proposals is that they disre-
gard the importance of the peremptory challenge to the jury system
197. See id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in the holding but dissatisfied
with the impact that eliminating the opportunity to secure minority representation on the
jury will have on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury).
198. See Altman, supra note 31, at 786 (proposing a system of affirmative selection that
allows the parties to seat rather than exclude jurors).
199. Id. at 806.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 807-08. "The defendant's ability to choose half of the jury prevents the jury
from being used as an organ of the prosecution. In addition, to the extent that affirmative
selection seats more minorities on juries, it promotes public confidence in the jury .... "
Id. at 808. Even if a monoracial jury is impaneled by this method, the fact that the par-
ties chose the jury attaches legitimacy. Id. at 811.
202. Id. at 807.
203. See Altman, supra note 31, at 808-09 (acknowledging the likelihood of
overrepresentation of minority or extreme viewpoints under affirmative selection, which
could result in a high number of hung juries).
Hans Zeisel, Professor of Law and Sociology, Emeritus, University of Chicago, con-
sidered some of the negative effects of affirmative jury selection. Hans Zeisel, Comment,
Affirmative Peremptory Juror Selection, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1165 (1987). Professor Zeisel
noted that affirmative selection may result in the seating of diametrically opposed jurors
which will increase the likelihood of hung juries. Id. at 1167 (noting that the jurors most
prejudiced toward either side will be seated). Of course, the success of each party in seat-
ing favorable jurors depends on their awareness of the jurors' predispositions. Id. at 1165-
66 (noting that it is unlikely that a party will have perfect knowledge of potential jurors'
predispositions).
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and to the protection of the criminal defendant. 4 "[T]he ju-
ry... is a criminal defendant's fundamental 'protection of life and
liberty against race or color prejudice,""'20 but unlike other formal
protections for the criminal defendant,' the jury is masked in an
environment of discretion through which prejudice can pene-
trate."' The peremptory challenge historically has been a major
protection by which the defendant can exclude those jurors who
exhibit a bias against him and create a more favorable forum for
his case.' The peremptory challenge also provides a margin of
protection from unsuccessful challenges for cause due to the limit-
ed allowance for voir dire questioning210 and the reluctance of
judges to excuse potentially biased jurors."' The peremptory chal-
lenge also provides both parties with an opportunity to affect the
composition of the decision-making body,' which enhances both
their respect for the verdict as well as society's confidence in the
juy 213jury. 3
The new peremptory inclusion strikes a balance between all of
these considerations. The inclusion is similar to the current method
of party challenges because it preserves the ability of parties to
exclude biased and unfavorable jurors. In addition, this new selec-
tion procedure assures the criminal defendant the ability to secure
204. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (the Court has traditionally viewed the
peremptory challenge as a "necessary part of trial by jury." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 219 (1965)).
205. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879)).
206. See infra text accompanying note 248 (discussing other procedural rights of the
criminal defendant in the adversary trial setting).
207. See Herman, supra note 27, at 1845.
208. Herman observes:
The potentially discriminatory attitudes of the jurors themselves are far more
critical than those of the lawyers. Yet by focusing all of our attention on how
jurors are selected, we allow ourselves to ignore the fact that discrimination
will still be able to enter and hide in the jury room.
Id. at 1852.
209. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 139. Despite the eventual allocation of peremptory
challenges to the prosecutor, federal and state statutes traditionally have granted more
peremptories to the defendants to maintain this advantage. Id. at 282-84 (listing the num-
ber of challenges provided to both parties in criminal and capital cases for all states).
210. Id.
211. Babcock, supra note 9, at 554-55; see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text
(discussing the reluctance of persons to admit biases during voir dire and the judge's
reluctance to excuse a juror who pled1ges impartiality).
212. VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 139-70.
213. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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peer representation on the jury without violating the equal protec-
tion doctrine now governing jury selection law. Moreover, it is
unlikely that this selection method will result in a greater number
of hung juries because the number of jurors a defendant may seat
peremptorily can be limited.24 This inclusionary approach also
enhances the legitimacy of the jury by giving effect to the
defendant's personal interest at stake.
A. The Peremptory Inclusion
As the name suggests, a peremptory inclusion would allow for
the inclusion of a juror peremptorily by the defense, meaning with-
out contest or removal by the prosecution.25 Under this modified
system, the criminal defendant would have the option of exercising
a peremptory inclusion in place of a statutorily authorized peremp-
tory challenge. In other words, the defendant could choose to pe-
remptorily include a venireperson placed in the jury-box as a juror
on the jury panel rather than exclude another.
In some jurisdictions, including many federal courts, the court
uses the "box" method to impanel the jury. The judge, or clerk of
the court, randomly seats potential jurors in the jury-box for voir
dire questioning and the exercise of challenges for cause. After
challenges for cause are exercised, the parties issue peremptory
challenges against the impaneled jurors in alternating order. Once a
juror is removed, another venireperson is randomly selected to
enter the jury-box to replace the challenged juror.2 6 This process
continues until the parties have exercised all of their peremptory
challenges.2"7 The peremptory inclusion would be exercised during
this stage of the jury selection process.
This inclusion could not be challenged by the prosecution
through the exercise of one of the state's peremptory challenges; to
so allow would destroy the inclusion's function of securing minori-
ty representation on the jury panel. A system of peremptory inclu-
214. See infra note 218 (discussing the limitation of the defendant's number and use of
the peremptory inclusion and the unlikelihood that the inclusion of one or two peers will
change the final verdict of the jury).
215. At this stage in the jury selection process, challenges for cause have been exer-
cised so the risk of bias or partiality of the juror is relatively low.
216. GEORGE, supra note 83, at 52-53 (describing the two basic methods used by fed-
eral judges in permitting attorneys to exercise challenges).
217. The number of peremptory challenges each party has is limited by statute. VAN
DYKE, supra note 6, at 140. In federal court, for felony cases, the defense has ten pe-
remptory challenges and the prosecution has six. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
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sions will allow the defendant, by affirmatively selecting certain
jurors, to attempt to achieve representation of his peers on the jury
panel without violating the rights of the prospective jurors. How-
ever, the defendant should not have the right to completely manip-
ulate the composition of the jury to his favor. Therefore, the right
of the defendant to exercise peremptory inclusions in substitution
for a peremptory challenge should be limited to a fraction of his
statutory number of peremptory challenges.2"'
B. An Inclusionary Approach to Jury Selection
Combining the Sixth Amendment requirements of impartiality,
a cross-section of the community, and a jury of one's peers, an
ideal jury can be defined as one drawn from inclusionary practices
to ensure representativeness."' However, the Court does not de-
fine an impartial jury in the same way, rather, it employs a nega-
tive definition that defines an impartial jury as one that has not
been drawn by discriminatory procedures that violate an equal
protection prohibition of exclusionary practices.' 0 This definition
218. This Note proposes limiting the number of peremptory inclusions to one-third the
number of peremptory challenges. In federal court, this would give the defendant the
option to exercise three of his ten peremptory challenges as peremptory inclusions. The
one-third limitation allows the defendant to include his peers on the jury and enhance
minority representation, without permitting him to control the jury with a majority of
sympathizers.
Studies of jury dynamics suggest that one or two dissenting jurors are not likely to
hold out against a majority vote and cause a hung jury. ABBOTr, supra note 92, at 98
(citing S. E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in BASIC STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 393, 393-401 (Harold Proshansky
& Bernard Seidenberg eds. 1965)). However, the presence of one or two peers on the
jury may affect the jury's dialogue during deliberations; and the purpose of a represen-
tative jury is to include diverse perspectives in the deliberations. Massaro, supra note 2,
at 564. Therefore, if the defendant is successful in selecting one or two minorities, the
likelihood of increased numbers of hung juries from this practice is unlikely.
Although the ability of the defendant to use all three peremptory inclusions to select
minority jurors may increase the chance of a hung jury, the rule of Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972), stating that a unanimous verdict is not required, may make the
minority coalition unsuccessful. Moreover, one can debate whether a hung jury is neces-
sarily a negative result. A hung jury may be a positive result when the jurors reach dif-
fering conclusions after observing the same evidence and testimony because it indicates
that there is not a consensus among the community that the defendant is guilty. See gen-
erally David A. Volirath & James H. Davis, Jury Size and Decision Rule, in THE JURY:
ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 73-103- (1980) (noting that two jurors at the same trial
may not agree on a verdict).
219. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 529-37 (explaining the history of the courts' non-
exclusionary practices of jury selection and the courts' reluctance to state what a proper
jury must include, other than at least six people who must reach a unanimous verdict).
220. Id at 529-30.
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concentrates on the process of selecting a jury," while an
inclusionary approach is more concerned with the substantive result
of the procedures.
The Court describes the cross-sectional requirement to be "an
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury tri-
al,"' and defines a cross-sectional jury as one that does not sys-
tematically exclude "distinctive groups in the community." But
while this nonexclusion rule satisfies the community-based interest
in participation in the justice system, it does not necessarily assure
the criminal defendant a fair and impartial jury. "4 The additional
requirement of a "jury of one's peers" recognizes the defendant's
intensely personal interest at stake in the verdict.'
Although the Court does not define the right to a "jury of
one's peers" to be the right to a "petit jury composed in whole or
in part of persons of [the defendant's] own race,"' many of its
decisions suggest a inclusionary imperative for the petit jury. The
Supreme Court has stated:
If any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from
the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
221. See Herman, supra note 27, at 1823 (discussing the desire to promote fair trials
through jury selection procedures). The Court stated in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 313 (1987): "[A]ny mode for determining guilt or punishment has its weakness-
es . . . [but] our consistent rule has been that constitutional guarantees are met 'when the
mode [for determining guilt or punishment] itself has been surrounded with safeguards to
make it as fair as possible."' (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
222. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
223. Id. at 538 ("In holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly
representative of the community . . . the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires
from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the
community .... ").
224. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 546-47.
The cross-representative requirement could actually defeat the defendant's right
to a fair jury. Depending on how local rules define the geographical area from
which jury pools are to be selected, a cross-section of the "community" could
be a totally homogeneous group of citizens known to harbor strong ill-will
toward people of the defendant's race or background.
Id. at 547.
225. See Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 829. The court also acknowledged the criminal
defendant's personal interest when it introduced the concept of a "jury of one's peers" in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 306, 308 (1879) ("The very idea of a jury is a body
of men composed of peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or sum-
moned to determine.").
226. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879)).
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human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of
a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case that may be presented.' 7
The Court made a similar observation in Ballard v. United
States: 8
The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the
action of women are the same as those which influence the
action of men-personality, background, economic status-
and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when
sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men
likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the
other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly represen-
tative of the community if all men were intentionally and
systematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that
the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed
of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other
is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom
from either may not in a given case make an iota of differ-
ence. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is
excluded. 9
However, despite the implicit references to the imperative of in-
cluding representative perspectives on the jury, the Court has con-
sistently held that the requirements of representativeness only ap-
plies to the venire pool." But the petit jury, not the venire, is
the democratic decision-making body that is designed to represent
the collective sentiments of the community." If
representativeness is not extended to the petit jury, then the prom-
227. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
228. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
229. Id. at 193-94.
230. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (stating that the Sixth Amendment
requires an impartial jury, not a representative one). Earlier, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 529 n.7 (1975), the Court noted that "[als long as there are significant depar-
tures from the cross sectional goal, biased juries are the result-biased in the sense that
they reflect a slanted view of the community they are supposed to represent."
231. See FuKuRA, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining that those deliberating must be repre-
sentative of the community on whose behalf they speak).
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ise of an exchange of collective sentiments found in the venire
pool is a hollow promise and the jury fails to serve its democratic
function.2
Perhaps the Court has declined the extension of
representativeness to the petit jury because of the administrative
difficulties in managing a jury system that requires the affirmative
representation of different groups, perhaps even proportional repre-
sentation," on the jury panel.' However, strict adherence to
demographic proportions is not the only method of achieving
representativeness. The most important goal of representativeness is
that it gives the jury the appearance of impartiality and fair-
ness.235 This does not require the presence of all distinct and
identifiable groups on the jury but only the representation of the
defendant's peers on the panel.
The Court retreats from the administrative difficulty of defining
"peer" for representativeness purposes. 6 But while this standard-
ization is difficult, if not impossible, it is also unnecessary. A peer
under the Sixth Amendment is what the defendant subjectively
232. The Court assumed in Taylor v. Louisiana that a representative jury pool will
result in a representative jury when it stated: "Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn
from a pool broadly representative of the community . . . . [The] broad representative
character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality
and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsi-
bility." 419 U.S. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
233. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 1695-1700 (proposing a system of racial quotas in
jury selection). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 n.6 (1986) ("[I]t would be
impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of
the heterogeneous nature of our society.")
234. See VAN DYKE, supra note 6, at 23 (discussing the need for impaneled juries to
reflect a cross-section of the community while acknowledging the impossibility of having
exact representation on all juries); see also Potash, supra note 32 (discussing how the
probable existence of racism in the "all white" jury would require minority representation
on jury panels).
235. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing visual image of jury and
effect on the legitimacy of the verdict).
236. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 560 n.272 (discussing the difficulty of defining
"peer" for purposes of mandatory juror inclusion). See also id. at 547-55 (discussing the
possible definition of "peer"). Gender and race may be necessary characteristics to satisfy
the visual image of a jury of the defendant's peers. See supra note 235 and accompany-
ing text. However, it is less clear whether age, occupation, or other socioeconomic factors
should be included in a selection standard. Further, there may be- overlap of many differ-
ent demographic groups within one individual. For example, under a proportional represen-
tation model or other mandatory inclusion model, how should an elderly black female be
treated? It is unclear whether the presence of this single juror on the jury should satisfy
representational requirements for the elderly, women, or blacks.
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values as an empathizer to his case, someone the defendant feels
will be able to understand his position.237 This designation may
be because of the juror's race, sex, age, or simply a shared occu-
pation. The peremptory inclusion allows this subjective decision to
be made by each individual defendant in each individual case, thus
securing the legitimacy of the jury and the verdict to society.23
In addition to the appearance of representativeness, some form
of affirmative inclusion on the petit jury also is necessary to com-
bat the inherent underrepresentation of minorities in the venire
pool. 9 Under the current system of jury selection, minority de-
fendants are at the mercy of the low statistical likelihood that a
minority juror will be placed on the jury panel randomly, because
of the failure of the system to qualify minorities as eligible ju-
237. See DAVID A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION-FROM HYPOTH-
ESIS TO PROOF 151 (1984) ("When a witness is in some way similar to a fact finder, a
witness' credibility may increase. And when the witness is dissimilar, credibility may well
decrease.") (citing B. COLLINS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119-25 (1970)); FUKuRAI, supra note
1, at 142-43 (suggesting that similar experiences and background between a juror and
defendant may help the juror to understand the motivations behind, and the context of,
the act). Because of the subtleties of bias, many jurors may not be aware of their preju-
dices, or they may underestimate the impact of prior experiences on their present perspec-
tives. See Babcock, supra note 9, at 554 (suggesting that this may be especially true in
cases of group bias where the juror may not realize that his views are not accepted out-
side of his group). The cultural context of the incident giving rise to the criminal charges
may create a barrier to white juries' understanding and objectively evaluating the racial
issues in the case. See FUKURA!, supra note 1, at 157. Bias is not black-white, nor
should the assumption be made that all white jurors are biased against minority defen-
dants, but the differing backgrounds and experiences of the jurors may affect their judge-
ment of the credibility of the witnesses and the defendant. Id. at 156-60 (discussing how
various differences among jurors can affect trial outcomes). Moreover, many people tend
to evaluate a person's credibility on the basis of gender, social class, racial and ethnic
background, and language; thus, jurors infuse subconscious bias into their consideration of
evidence and witnesses. See id. at 157.
238. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 513 ("[A] verdict by a jury composed of representa-
tives of key community groups-minority and nonminority women and men-is more
likely to be acceptable to all of these groups than would one judge's ruling.").
239. See FUKURAI, supra note 1, at 34 (listing various causes of minority
underrepresentation in venires). The use of registered voters' rolls as a source list for the
jury pool results in minority underrepresentation because blacks and Hispanics are less
likely to register to vote. Id. at 18. Also, the increased residential mobility of minorities,
owing to their likelihood to be employed in secondary labor markets, makes them ineligi-
ble to vote or serve as a juror for failing to meet residential requirements. Id. at 21-26.
The process of judicial district gerrymandering further limits minority participation. Id at
29-34 (offering specific examples of systematic inclusion and exclusion of minority neigh-
borhoods that result in minority underrepresentation). See also Massaro, supra note 2, at
509 (arguing socioeconomic factors result in underrepresentation on the venire); VAN
DYKE, supra note 6, at 30 (finding black mobility and infrequent updating of source lists
to result in underrepresentation).
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C. Fair Jury Selection Procedures
The peremptory inclusion satisfies the defendant's constitutional
right to a representative jury of his peers, but, in addition to
achieving substantive results, the jury selection practice must be
functional. Professor Massaro outlines three requirements for fair
jury selection procedures:
The first requirement is that the constitutional standard be a
simple one. The second is that the judiciary have adequate
control over the means of effectuating enforcement. The
third is that the public acquiesce-there is no need for
agreement, simply the absence of opposition-in the prin-
ciple and its application.24
The peremptory inclusion meets all three requirements.
First, the peremptory inclusion is a simple constitutional stan-
dard because it is an inclusionary practice, rather than an
exclusionary practice that may foster discrimination. The proposed
peremptory inclusion does not violate the prospective juror's rights
under the Equal Protection Clause because he is not being exclud-
ed from the jury, rather he or she is being selected. The Court
recognized in Powers v. Ohio that "[ain individual juror does not
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury," but only the right
to not be excluded from any jury on the basis of race.242
Second, the judge is able to exercise control over the inclusion
method without difficulty because it involves a limited exercise
without a subjective decision on the judge's part to approve the
exercise.
Third, because the peremptory inclusion enhances
representativeness on the jury, it will likewise enhance the public's
confidence in the jury system and the legitimacy of the jury ver-
dict. However, a possible source of opposition may come from the
prosecutor, who is not granted the similar opportunity to select
jurors to the State's liking. The objective of the criminal justice
240. See generally FUKURAI, supra note I (discussing legal and nonlegal factors of
minority underrepresentation in every stage of venire and jury selection).
241. Massaro, supra note 2, at 542 (citing Philip B. Kurland, Equal Education Opporlu-
nity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Ct. L. REv. 583, 592
(1968)).
242. 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
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system is fairness, and fairness allows for asymmetrical treatment
of the defense and prosecution based on their different roles in the
adversary setting.'" In fact, in our legal system, the concept of
justice refers to the like treatment of persons in similar situations,
while fairness recognizes the different circumstances of each person
and crime and recommends differing treatment based on the indi-
vidual situation. In addition, our criminal justice system is built
asymmetrically to give the accused an advantage in the trial.2'
Justice Black observed that "tactical advantage to the defendant is
inherent in the type of [criminal] trial required by our Bill of
Rights."2
45
Different treatment of the accused and the State is necessary to
strike the proper balance between partisan advocacy and fair-
ness.2' The advantages given to the defendant are to compensate
for the "awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of govern-
ment."'247 These include the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment rights to trial by an im-
partial jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to compulso-
ry process, and to assistance of counsel, and the due process rights
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.248 While the defen-
dant has the right to remain silent throughout the trial, the Due
Process Clause requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favor-
able to the defense249 and to bear the burden of proving guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Any opposition by the State is with-
out support in the criminal justice system.
Under this new jury selection practice of peremptory inclusions
the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right is advanced by
allowing the defendant to define and select his peers, helping to
create an impartial and representative jury. Moreover, as a result of
increased representativeness and impartiality, the legitimacy of the
jury system is enhanced in the eyes of the defendant, as well as
243. See Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 821, 825-26.
244. ld. at 821-22.
245. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
246. Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 821.
247. Williams, 399 U.S. at 112.
248. Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 821 n.78.
249. Id. at 822. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) (discussing
the prosecutor's duty to reveal all relevant information pertaining to the defendant); Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (stating that suppression of evidence favorable to the
defense is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).
250. Goldwasser, supra note 3, at 822.
19941
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the eyes of society.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment is a paramount right for the criminal
defendant to ensure a fair and impartial jury. The guarantee of a
public trial is also important to society because it establishes popu-
lar participation in the democratic decision-making process. The
right to serve on a jury is a fundamental right of prospective jurors
that is protected from discriminatory exclusion under of the Four-
teenth Amendment. But a jury system must be flexible to accom-
modate the growth and change of modem societal needs. 5 ' The
Supreme Court itself has noted that "[c]ommunities differ at differ-
ent times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or
place is not necessarily a fair cross-section at another time or a
different place.' ' 2 Thus, the Court has modified the traditional
jury system to meet the new demands of society. Foremost among
its modifications, the Court has restricted the use of the historically
protected peremptory challenge to prohibit the exercise of a chal-
lenge for discriminatory purposes. The Court's nonexclusion theory
is a necessary step in the elimination of discrimination in the
courtroom, but it is not clearly determined to be effective in this
endeavor. Discrimination still exists in the jury system, but after
Batson there is no weapon with which to fight.
The restriction on peremptory challenges is necessary to protect
the rights of the prospective jurors but it also hinders the
defendant's ability to impanel an impartial and representative jury.
Therefore, a new jury selection practice is needed to enhance
representativeness to satisfy the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right. The peremptory inclusion serves this purpose by providing an
affirmative weapon to fight racism by securing the presence of
minority jurors on the jury, which adds important perspectives and
experiences to the jury deliberations. Most of the emphasis of this
Note is on the right of minority defendants to have members of
their racial or ethnic groups on the jury, but the right to an impar-
tial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community should
also include the right of nonminority defendants to have a racially-
mixed jury. In Peters v. Kiff, a white petitioner challenged the
251. See Massaro, supra note 2, at 504-10 (discussing the evolution of juries as a re-
flection of the changing needs of society).
252. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
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exclusion of blacks from both the grand and petit juries. 3 The
Court held that the racial background of the defendant was irrele-
vant to the requirement of a fair cross-section of the community
for jury selection.1 4 The Court found that the rights of defen-
dants transcend racial barriers when it stated:
The precise question in this case, then, is whether a State
may subject a defendant to indictment and trial by grand
juries and petit juries that are plainly illegal in their com-
position, and leave the defendant without recourse on the
ground that he had in any event no right to a grand or
petit jury at all. We conclude . . that to do so denies the
defendant due process of law.s
The peremptory inclusion would be available for all criminal defen-
dants to enhance the representativeness of the jury. In addition, this
ability to select several jurors would increase the legitimacy of the
verdict to both the defendant and society.
DONNA J. MEYER
253. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). But see Torres v. Florida, 541 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (interpreting Batson to require that, in order to establish a case of discrimina-
tion, the defendant must show that he is a member of the racial group purposefully ex-
cluded by prosecution peremptory challenges).
254. Peters, 407 U.S. at 504.
255. Id. at 501.
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